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Say Goodbye to Frye: Missouri Supreme
Court Clarifies Standard for Admitting
Expert Testimony in Civil and
Administrative Cases
State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonaghl
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many questions that a court must address when determining
whether to admit expert testimony. 2 The reliability of the scientific method,
facts, and information used by the expert in forming her opinion is a major
issue. With all of the major scientific advances throughout the last century,
courts have struggled with new scientific methods and have developed a
number of tests to determine the admissibility of expert testimony.
In State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh,3 the
Supreme Court of Missouri clarified the standard of admissibility for expert
testimony in civil cases and administrative proceedings. This Note will exam-
ine the different standards that Missouri courts have applied and explore how
the new McDonagh standard will impact Missouri courts.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts (the "Board") is
charged with the duty of licensing and supervising Missouri physicians and
surgeons.4 In 1961, the Board granted a medical license to Dr. Edward W.
McDonagh ("McDonagh"), an osteopathic physician and surgeon. 5 Shortly
thereafter, McDonagh began using ethylene diamine tetra-acetic acid
("EDTA") chelation therapy6 on his elderly patients who were suffering from
atherosclerosis.7 At the time, the Board did not have any rules or regulations
1. 123 S.W.3d 146 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
2. See FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note ("An intelligent evaluation
of facts is often difficult or impossible without the application of some scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge.").
3. 123 S.W.3d 146 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
4. Id. at 149.
5. Id.
6. Chelation therapy consists of the intravenous administration of EDTA which
combines with substances in the body that block arteries. Id. at 149 n.3, 150 n.4.
These substances are expelled from the patient's body through urine. Id.
7. Id. at 149. Atherosclerosis is "the process in which deposits of fatty sub-
stances, cholesterol, cellular waste products, calcium and other substances build up in
1
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regarding chelation therapy,8 but it eventually adopted a rule 9 in 2001 con-
cluding that such therapy had "no medical value." 10
The Board filed a complaint against McDonagh in 1994 after it received
inquires about McDonagh's use of chelation therapy. 11 "This complaint was
later dismissed without prejudice."' 2 In 1996, the Board again filed a com-
plaint against McDonagh 1 3 This thirteen-count complaint alleged that
McDonagh should be disciplined for endangering his patients' health by us-
ing chelation therapy and misrepresenting its effectiveness.1
4
The Administrative Hearing Commission (the "Commission") held a
hearing in which McDonagh offered expert testimony from physicians who
practiced chelation therapy to show that the treatment was effective.' The
Board claimed that the physicians' expert testimony did not pass the test de-
veloped in Frye v. United States'6 and moved to exclude it;17 however, the
Commission admitted the testimony, finding that it satisfied the standards in
both Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc." and Frye.'9 Relying on
the physicians' testimony, the Commission concluded that there was "no
cause to discipline Dr. McDonagh's medical license."20 After the Commis-
sion's decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Cole County,2" the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals for the Western District agreed that the expert testi-
the inner lining of an artery." American Heart Association, Atherosclerosis, available
at http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier--4440 (last visited Dec. 4,
2004).
8. Healing Arts, 123 S.W.3d at 150. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approved the use of chelation therapy to remove heavy metals from a patient's body.
Id. at 149-50. McDonagh's use of the therapy was not FDA-approved, but it was not
expressly prohibited by the FDA. Id. at 150. About one thousand physicians through-
out the United States use chelation therapy in this non-approved manner. Id.
9. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 4, § 150-2.165 (2003) (stating that "the use of...
(EDTA) chelation on a patient is of no medical or osteopathic value except for those
uses approved by the Food and Drug Administration").
10. Healing Arts, 123 S.W.3d at 150-51.




15. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, No. 96-2543
HA (Mo. Admin. Hearing Comm'n Jan. 26, 2000), available at
http://www.oa.state.mo.us/ahc/case/McDonagh96-2543HA.WCR.doc.
16. 293 F. 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
17. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, No. WD 60501,
2003 WL 1477049, at * 2 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2003), transferred, 123 S.W.3d 146
(Mo. 2003) (en banc).
18. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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mony was admissible under Missouri Revised Statute Section 490.06522 and
rejected the Board's argument that the Frye test should be applied.23 How-
ever, the court reversed and remanded the Commission's decision for insuffi-
cient evidence.24
The Missouri Supreme Court granted transfer to decide the appropriate
standard for the admissibility of expert testimony.25 The high court held that
the admissibility standard for expert testimony in civil cases is not Frye or
Daubert, but Section 490.065.26 In addition, the court held that this standard
applies not only in civil cases, but in administrative proceedings as well 7
The court remanded the case to the commission "on all counts for further
review in light of [S]ection 490.065.28
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Frye and Missouri Courts
Courts have long struggled in determining the admissibility of expert
testimony, especially with regard to what methods experts may use to reach
their conclusion. Prior to 1923, many courts focused primarily on "whether
the expert was qualified., 29 They also considered the relevancy of the evi-
30dence and how helpful it would be to the court. In 1923, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia formulated the Frye test to
determine the admissibility of an expert's testimony based on a new scientific
procedure.3' That court concluded that the method used by an expert "must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs. 32 Most states and other federal courts followed this
"general acceptance" test.33
22. Mo. REV. STAT. § 490.065 (2000). See infra note 42.
23. Healing Arts, 2003 WL 1477049, at *5.
24. Id.
25. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d
146, 151-52 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
26. Id. at 153.
27. Id. at 155.
28. Id. at 160.
29. Robin Jean Davis, Admitting Expert Testimony in Federal Courts and Its
Impact on West Virginia Jurisprudence, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 485, 487 (2002).
30. Id. at 487-88.
31. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that a
"systolic blood pressure deception test" had not yet reached the general acceptance
needed and was not admissible).
32. Id.
33. Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of
Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453, § 31 (2004).
Fifteen states continue to follow the Frye test. Id. at § 2.
2004] 1205
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The Missouri Supreme Court first adopted the Frye test in 1972 in a
criminal case.34 This test was modified eight years later, changing the stan-
dard from "general acceptance" to "wide scientific approval" of the new sci-
entific method.35 In Alsbach v. Bader,36 the Missouri Supreme Court applied
the modified Frye test in a civil case. 37 At issue in that case was the
admissibility of testimony rendered with the aid of hypnosis.38 Alsbach, the
plaintiff, was hypnotized by a psychiatrist to aid in the recovery of Alsbach's
memory of an automobile accident. 39 The court held that hypnosis was not
"general[ly] accept[ed] in the relevant scientific community. ' 4° Following Als-
bach, the Frye test was applied in a number of other civil cases in Missouri.41
B. Missouri Revised Statute Section 490.065 and Daubert
In 1989, the Missouri General Assembly enacted Missouri Revised
Statute Section 490.065 to deal with the admissibility of expert testimony.
42
Despite this new statute, Missouri courts continued to apply the Frye test.
43
34. State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Mo. 1972) (holding that "neutron acti-
vation analysis" did not pass the Frye general acceptance test).
35. State v. Biddle, 599 S.W.2d 182, 191 (Mo. 1980) (en bane) (holding that a
polygraph test lacked "wide scientific approval" and was inadmissible).
36. 700 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1985) (en bane), superseded by statute as stated in
State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146 (Mo.
2003) (en bane).
37. Id. at 828.
38. Id. at 823.
39. Id. at 824.
40. Id. at 830.
41. See, e.g., Brooks v. SSM Health Care, 73 S.W.3d 686, 694 (Mo. Ct. App.
2002) (holding in a medical negligence case that a doctor's testimony on the standard
of care was properly admitted under the wide scientific approval test of Biddle); Elam
v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 200 n.79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting claim that
expert's diagnostic procedure did not satisfy the Frye test); Turner v. Fuqua Homes,
Inc., 742 S.W.2d 603, 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (acknowledging that Missouri
adopted the Frye general acceptance standard).
42. Mo. REV. STAT. § 490.065 (2000). This statute provides:
1. In any civil action, if scientific, technical or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opin-
ion or otherwise.
2. Testimony by such an expert witness in the form of an opinion or infer-
ence otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ul-
timate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
3. The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at
or before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by ex-
1206 (Vol. 69
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In 1993, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 superseded the Frye test in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc.44 The Court held that judges, not the scientific community,
have the role of gatekeeper when it comes to the admissibility of expert tes-
timony. 45 The Court also set out a list of factors to guide courts when deter-
mining admissibility under the new standard.46 The general acceptance test
became merely one of the factors.47
Because Missouri Revised Statute Section 490.065 was similar to Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 702, Missouri courts were conflicted about whether
Missouri's statute superseded previous case law endorsing the Frye standard.
In Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital,48 the Missouri Supreme Court
refused to decide if the statute supplanted Frye because the appellant in that
case had not preserved its objection to the admissibility of the plaintiffs ex-
perts.49 In Lasky v. Union Electric Co.,5° the issue of which standard to apply
came before the Missouri Supreme Court again. In remanding that case, the
court instructed the trial court to "be guided by Section 490.065, RSMo, in
evaluating the admission of expert testimony." 51 Since the supreme court was
not explicit in holding that this statute had superseded Frye, the three districts
of the Missouri Courts of Appeals remained split about which standard to use.
In its western district, the Missouri Court of Appeals has applied both
the Frye test and Section 490.065, with and without the aid of the Daubert
perts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and
must be otherwise reasonably reliable.
4. If a reasonable foundation is laid, an expert may testify in terms of
opinion or inference and give the reasons therefor without the use of hy-
pothetical questions, unless the court believes the use of a hypothetical
question will make the expert's opinion more understandable or of greater
assistance to the jury due to the particular facts of the case.
43. See, e.g., Bray v. Bi-State Dev. Corp., 949 S.W.2d 93, 98 (Mo. Ct. App.
1997).
44. 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). The federal rules were later amended to incorpo-
rate Daubert. FED. R. EvlD. 702 advisory committee's note.
45. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579-80.
46. The Daubert Court set forth the following factors: "whether the theory or
technique has been subject to peer review and publication;" "whether it can be (and
has been) tested;" "the known or potential rate of error;" and "general acceptance." Id.
at 593-94.
47. Id. at 594.
48. 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
49. Id. at 860 ("[I]t would be inappropriate for us to decide in this case whether
section 490.065 . . .supersedes the Frye doctrine in the same manner that Daubert
held that Federal Rule 702 changes the requirements for the admissibility of expert
testimony in federal court.").
50. 936 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
51. Id. at 801.
2004] 1207
5
Nies: Nies: Say Goodbye to Frye:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
factors. In Whitman's Candies, Inc. v. Pet Inc.,52 the court of appeals consid-
ered the admissibility of a consumer psychologist's testimony.5 3 The defen-
dant argued that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by Sec-
tion 490.065 and since this Section was similar to Federal Rule of Evidence
702, Daubert was instructive. 4 Noting that the Missouri Supreme Court had
not yet expressly overruled Frye, the court concluded that the expert testi-
mony satisfied both the Frye and Daubert standards. 55 Consequently, the
56court declined to determine which standard was appropriate. In a later case,
McReynolds v. Mindrup,57 the court reviewed a trial court's decision to ex-
clude expert testimony because it did not pass the Frye test.58 The court found
that the trial court should not have applied Frye because the testimony did not
deal with scientific methods59 Again, the court did not determine whether
Frye was superseded. 60 In Keyser v. Keyser,6' the court applied only Section
490.065 without mentioning the Daubert factors.62 The court held that it was
not an abuse of discretion to admit a psychiatrist's testimony regarding his
diagnosis when that diagnosis is based on examination of the patient and the
63patient's medical records.
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District continued to
follow Frye for scientific evidence, but applied Section 490.065 to non-
scientific evidence. In Long v. Missouri Delta Medical Center,64 a medical
malpractice case, the court held that a medical economist's testimony was
properly admitted.65 The court stated that "there seems to be a consensus
66among appellate courts" that the Frye test was still followed in Missouri.
The court held that the Frye test was to be followed for scientific evidence
and further concluded that Section 490.065, without using the Daubert fac-
52. 974 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998), abrogated by State Bd. of Registration
for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 528.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 108 S.W.3d 662 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002), abrogated by Healing Arts, 123
S.W.3d 146.
58. Id. at 665-66.
59. Id. at 668.
60. Id. at 666 n.2.
61. 81 S.W.3d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
62. See id.
63. Id. at 169-70.
64. 33 S.W.3d 629 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000), abrogated by State Bd. of Registration
for the Healing Arts, 123 S.W.3d 146 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
65. Id. at 643. The medical economist testified regarding his calculations of the
future medical care costs of disabled children. Id.
66. Id. at 642.
1208 [Vol. 69
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tors, governed the admissibility of expert testimony on non-scientific evi-
dence.67
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District continued to fol-
68low the Frye test. In Bray v. Bi-State Development Corp., the court noted
that "Missouri ha[d] adopted the Frye rule for determining the admissibility
of new scientific techniques. 69 In MC. v. Yeargin,7° a negligence action, the
court examined the admissibility of a doctor's testimony.71 The court held
that the trial court abused its discretion because it admitted the doctor's testi-
mony without applying the Frye test.
72
C. Evidence Rules and Administrative Hearings
Administrative tribunals are not bound by all the same rules of evidence
as civil courts. According to the Missouri Supreme Court, an administrative
tribunal does not have to follow a technical rule of evidence,73 but the tribunal
does have to follow a fundamental 74 evidence rule. 75 While the administrative
tribunal must follow fundamental rules, Missouri courts have still upheld the
admissibility of evidence that such rules would usually exclude as long as
there was other "competent and substantial evidence" to support the decision
made in the administrative hearing.76 In State ex rel. Bond v. Simmons,77 the
court upheld the administrative tribunal's admission of hearsay and conclu-
sory statements made by the witness even though the evidence is governed by
67. Id. at 642-43. The Southern District continued to adhere to the modified Frye
test for scientific evidence in a subsequent case. Brooks v. SSM Health Care, 73
S.W.3d 686, 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
68. 949 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
69. Id. at 98.
70. 11 S.W.3d 604 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999), abrogated by State Bd. of Registration
for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
71. Id. at 619.
72. Id. at 619-20.
73. Technical rules of evidence have included "leading questions and other in-
formalities." State ex rel. De Weese v. Morris, 221 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Mo. 1949).
74. Fundamental rules of evidence have included hearsay and conclusions by
witnesses. See State ex rel Bond v. Simmons, 299 S.W.2d 540, 545 (Mo. Ct. App.
1957).
75. Mo. Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm'n, 560 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Mo.
1977) (en banc) (citing Simmons, 299 S.W.2d at 545) (stating "technical rules of evi-
dence are not controlling in administrative hearings, [but] fundamental rules of evi-
dence are applicable").
76. See Simmons, 229 S.W.2d at 545 (affirming judgment because "the decision
of the Commission is clearly based upon an abundance of competent and substantial
evidence"). The Missouri Constitution mandates that judicial review of an administra-
tive decision affecting private rights determine that the decision is "supported by
competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record." MO. CONST. art. V, § 18.
77. 299 S.W.2d 540 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957).
20041 1209
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a fundamental rule.78 The court found that the evidence, "in the main," was
both "competent and relevant."
7 9
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Missouri Supreme Court granted transfer of the instant case to de-
termine the standard for the admissibility of expert testimony.8° Contending
that Missouri follows the Frye test, the Board argued that McDonagh's expert
testimony should not have been admitted.8' McDonagh, however, contended
that Missouri no longer follows the Frye test but instead follows either
Daubert or Section 490.065.82 The court concluded that its decision in Lasky
v. Union Electric Co. 83 "that the standard for the admission of expert testi-
mony in civil cases is that set forth in Section 490.065" should have cleared
"this confusion.
84
The court next addressed whether Section 490.065 applies to administra-
tive hearings. 85 The Board argued that it did not apply because the language
of Section 490.065 says it only applies "in any civil action."86 However, the
court pointed out that neither civil procedure rules nor administrative proce-
dure rules govern the admissibility of expert testimony, but rather the princi-
ples of evidence determine the admissibility.87 Following the precedent in
State ex rel. De Weese,8 8 that technical evidence rules do not have to be fol-
lowed in administrative hearings but fundamental rules of evidence do, the
court held that the admissibility of expert testimony is a fundamental rule of
evidence. 89 Therefore, Section 490.065 should be followed in administrative
proceedings.9o
78. Id. at 545.
79. Id.
80. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d
146, 151-52 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
81. Id. at 152.
82. Id.
83. 936 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). See supra notes 50-51 and accompa-
nying text.
84. Healing Arts, 123 S.W.3d at 153. Judge Wolff made this clear with his ad-
vice for lawyers: "Forget Frye. Forget Daubert. Read the statute. Section 490.065 is
written, conveniently, in English. It has 204 words. Those straightforward statutory
words are all you really need to know about the admissibility of expert testimony in
civil proceedings." Id. at 160 (Wolff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. Id. at 153-55.
86. Id. at 153-54.
87. Id. at 154.
88. 221 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. 1949).
89. Healing Arts, 123 S.W.3d at 154-55.
90. Id. at 155.
1210 [Vol. 69
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Although the court did not adopt Daubert, it concluded that for those
provisions of Section 490.065 that mirror FRE 702 and FRE 703, the Daubert
standards and the cases that interpret Daubert can guide Missouri courts.91
These guidelines, however, do not apply where Section 490.065 and the fed-
eral rules differ.92 While Section 490.065 "requires a showing that the facts
and data are of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject of the expert's testimony," FRE 703
only requires this showing when determining "whether the facts or data must
be otherwise admissible. 93 Because of this difference, the "relevant scientific
community" must always be identified in Missouri but not under the federal
rules.94 In addition, a Missouri court must "independently assess" the reliabil-
ity of the facts and data.
95
Since Missouri courts must determine the relevant community in each
case, the identity of the community to which McDonagh's experts belonged
was important.96 McDonagh argued that the relevant community was the
community of doctors that practice chelation therapy.97 The court disagreed,
finding that the relevant community should be determined "by the standards
in the field in which the doctor has chosen to practice." 98 As applied to
McDonagh, the relevant community consisted of doctors who treat patients
with vascular disease. 99
After ruling that Section 490.065 controls the admissibility of expert tes-
timony, the court addressed the issue of what data are required under Section
490.065 and rejected the Board's argument that controlled studies were nec-
essary.' 0" The court explained that controlled studies are a kind of data and
the admissibility of an expert's testimony does not depend on the kind of data
but whether it is data that is reasonably relied on in the relevant field.' 0' The
court explained that the absence of a controlled study is relevant to the court's
91. Id. The first part of FRE 702 and Missouri Revised Statute Section 490.065.1
are almost identical. Id. These provisions state "[i]f scientific, technical, or other spe-
cialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 702; Mo. REV. STAT. 490.065.1 (2000)). Section 490.065.1 is
different in that it adds "in any civil action." Id.
92. Id.






99. Id. at 156-57.
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decision but not conclusive. 10 2 The only way it could be conclusive is if the
"relevant scientific community" absolutely demanded that there be controlled
studies. 1
03
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision be-
cause the Commission did not take the appropriate relevant community into
account or apply the other standards under Section 490.065 when admitting
McDonagh's experts. The court further remanded the case directing the Com-
mission to use Section 490.065 in deciding whether to admit the expert testi-104
mony.
V. COMMENT
With this holding, Missouri joins four other states that do not follow
Frye or Daubert in civil cases. 10 Arguably, however, the standard adopted by
the Missouri Supreme Court is a more rigid form of the Daubert test. The
court indicated that lower courts can use Daubert and its progeny to guide
them in determining most expert testimony admissibility issues. 10 6 The major-
ity of Section 490.065 is similar to FRE 702 and 703, suggesting that many
Missouri courts will use Daubert as a guide. 107 In fact, the provisions are so
similar that other states that have the same provision as Section 490.065.1
have decided to adopt Daubert.'0°
The Missouri approach is arguably stricter than Daubert because it re-
quires that a court define the "relevant scientific community" in each and
every case. 1°9 While this may not seem like a major requirement, it could
cause otherwise admissible testimony to be totally excluded. For instance,
assume McDonagh's experts were using data only from within the field of
chelation therapy. To be admissible under the Missouri statute, however, his
experts needed to use data reasonably relied on by the community of vascular
physicians. Under the federal approach, if the experts could otherwise satisfy
the Daubert factors, the relevant community is immaterial unless a party
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 160.
105. See Lustre, supra note 33, §§ 50-53. These four states are Georgia, Utah,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
106. Healing Arts, 123 S.W.3d at 155.
107. For instance, Section 490.065.1 is similar to FRE 702, except for the post-
Daubert amendments. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 395 (Alaska 1999) (holding that
Alaska Rule of Evidence 702 supersedes Frye and that Daubert should now be fol-
lowed); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Foote, 14 S.W.3d 512, 519 (Ark. 2000) (adopt-
ing the Daubert standard under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 702).
109. Mo. REv. STAT. § 490.065.3 (2000).
1212 [Vol. 69
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wanted to admit the underlying facts or data rather than just the expert's con-
clusions.1
10
In Missouri, the courts must go one step further after identifying the
relevant community. Even if the facts and data are reasonably relied on by the
experts within this community, the court must make an independent judgment
that the facts and data are reasonable."' The Missouri General Assembly
likely added this extra hurdle to exclude so-called "junk science" and to en-
sure that judges make the final determination of the admissibility of expert
opinions. l '
2
The importance of the court's independent judgment is illustrated by a
recent decision of the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District
which relied on the holding of McDonagh. In McGuire v. Seltsam,113 an
automobile accident case, the defendant offered the testimony of a psychia-
trist claiming that the plaintiff had a somatization disorder.' "4 The psychiatrist
explained that the standard in her profession when diagnosing this disorder
was to determine if the plaintiff had "somatic complaints that are not substan-
tiated by an organic cause prior to age 30."'"s The psychiatrist examined only
the medical records of the plaintiff from the age of 34 to the present. " 6 She
explained that when the records are not available prior to the age of 30, psy-
chiatrists use the later medical records to determine if any of the conditions
existed before the age of 30.117 While this may be what experts in this field
rely on, the court found it to be "based upon speculation and conjecture".and
held that the trial court should not have admitted the testimony."' This strict
Daubert-like test may make it more difficult for an attorney to have expert
110. In Daubert, the Court noted that "[a] 'reliability assessment does not require,
although it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and
an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that commu-
nity."' Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (quoting United
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)).
111. Healing Arts, 123 S.W.3d at 156. The Supreme Court of Missouri accurately
interpreted the statute as requiring this extra hurdle on the admission of expert testi-
mony. The relevant portion of the statute that requires this states that the facts and
data used by the expert "must be otherwise reasonably reliable." Mo. REV. STAT. §
490.065.3.
112. See State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 395-96 (Alaska 1999) (explaining that
"[d]etermining reliability for judicial purposes is unavoidably the responsibility of
trial courts, and should not be delegated to an expert's peers").
113. No. WD 61448, 2004 WL 502308 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2004), trans-
ferred, 138 S.W.3d 118 (Mo. 2004) (en banc).
114. Id. at * 1. A patient with a somatization disorder complains of physical symp-
toms that the doctor finds have no physical cause or the description of the symptoms
"are greatly in excess of that which the doctor would expect to see." Id.
115. Id. at *3.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at *4.
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testimony admitted. Daubert itself has proven to be stricter than Frye,' 9 and
the Missouri approach is even stricter than Daubert.
The court's holding also impacts Missouri administrative proceed-
ings.120 The court claimed that admissibility of expert testimony is a funda-
mental rule of evidence.' 21 The court does not explain what constitutes a fun-
damental rule of evidence and why expert testimony falls into that cate-
gory.' 22 However, previous Missouri cases have held that hearsay rules and
the common law lay-witness opinion rule are fundamental rules of evi-
dence.' 23 Hearsay is an important evidentiary safeguard that implicates the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.' 24 Like hearsay, reliable expert tes-
timony is also an important evidentiary safeguard. The purpose of expert
testimony is to aid the fact-finder. If the facts and data used by the expert are
not reliable, the purpose is frustrated and the fact-finder is actually misled. In
fact, there has been much debate over whether jurors blindly accept what the
experts say, and it has been suggested that Daubert was an effort to give the
judge more control in protecting the jury from unreliable experts. 125 Because
119. David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the
General Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 385,404 (2001).
120. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d
146, 154-55 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). While Section 490.065 applies to civil and admin-
istrative proceedings, Frye is still followed in criminal cases in Missouri. State v.
Keightley, 147 S.W.3d 179, 187 n.7 ("We are cognizant of our supreme court's hold-
ing in [Healing Arts], stating that Section 490.065, and not Frye, is the applicable
standard for determining the admissibility of expert testimony in civil cases. This does
not, however, affect the applicability of Frye to criminal cases.").
121. Healing Arts, 123 S.W.3d at 154-55. If it were only a technical rule of evi-
dence, the administrative court would not have to follow Section 490.065 in admitting
expert testimony.
122. At least one other state has considered expert testimony a technical rule of
evidence. Armstrong v. City of Wichita, 907 P.2d 923, 929 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) ("To
apply the Daubert or the Frye standard to a workers compensation case would be to
apply technical rules of procedure to which neither the ALJ nor the Board are sub-
ject.").
123. See, e.g., State ex rel. De Weese v. Morris, 221 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Mo. 1949)
(hearsay evidence); State ex rel. Bond v. Simmons, 299 S.W.2d 540, 545 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1957) (hearsay and conclusions by witnesses).
124. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating "the accused shall enjoy the right... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him"). See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
155 (1970) (stating "that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally
designed to protect similar values").
125. Neil Vidmar & Sheri Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66
BROOK. L. REv. 1121, 1124-25 (2001) ("[T]he Court, by stressing the judge's role as
gatekeeper, appears implicitly to have assumed that the judge should protect the
jury."). See also Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic & Valerie P. Hans, Jurors' Evaluations of
Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY
441, 442 (2003) ("One key assumption underlying the Daubert line of cases is that
jurors might be duped by a persuasive but untrustworthy expert who testifies about
1214 [Vol. 69
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 18
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss4/18
SAY GOODBYE TO FRYE
Missouri's expert testimony standard is more rigid than Daubert, Missouri
obviously believes in protecting the jury a great deal. A rule of evidence
based on such a strong belief can accurately be classified as fundamental.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Board of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh,12 6 the Mis-
souri Supreme Court clarified for the lower courts the standard of admissibil-
ity for expert testimony. The court explicitly held that Missouri follows Sec-
tion 490.065, no longer follows Frye, and does not adopt Daubert.127 The
Missouri Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 490.065 indicates that
Missouri courts will follow a strict Daubert-like standard, but Missouri's
standard is more rigorous than Frye or Daubert.
The court also extended the application of Section 490.065 to adminis-
trative proceedings. This will greatly affect the admissibility of expert testi-
mony in such proceedings. After the instant decision, Missouri courts and
attorneys should be clear that Missouri no longer follows Frye. Instead, Sec-
tion 490.065 alone is the standard for admitting expert testimony in civil and
administrative proceedings in Missouri.
JAIME M. NIES
matters that are not based on sound scientific principles or data."). Recent research,
however, has shown that jurors do not blindly accept what the expert says and that
juries take into consideration the "adversarial context in assessing expert credibility."
Id. at 478-79.
126. 123 S.W.3d 146 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
127. Id. at 153-55.
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